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When Confidentiality is not Essential
to Mediation and Competing Interests
Necessitate Disclosure
State v. Williams'
I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation is a process where a neutral intervener helps disputing parties develop a mutually beneficial resolution. Confidentiality is an established element
of mediation. In general, confidentiality furthers the ability of the parties to seek
mutually beneficial outcomes to disputes that would otherwise customarily produce a win/lose result. Confidentiality encourages parties to explore their underlying interests, without fear of the repercussions of revealing such information.
Arguments are asserted that mediation will not succeed without the assurance that
communications will be protected by a confidentiality privilege. The Uniform
Mediation Act (UMA) has attempted to clarify the various confidentiality protections afforded by individual states. No confidentiality statute that includes the
UMA provision creates an absolute confidentiality privilege, and in fact all such
statutes provide a number of express exceptions. One such exception exists when
mediation information is sought for use in a criminal proceeding. 2 A criminal
defendant is entitled under the United States Constitution to present a complete
defense and the confidentiality privilege [rotecting mediation can intrude on a
criminal defendant's constitutional rights. Mediation is now well-established,
and the need for confidentiality to maintain the effectiveness and integrity of the
process may not be as necessary as once thought when there is a substantial competing interest.
]I. FACTS & HOLDING
Defendant-Appellant Carl Williams (Williams) was embroiled in a family
dispute with his brother-in-law Brahima Bocoum (Bocoum), which culminated in
an altercation between the two.4 Bocoum left threatening messages on Williams'
voicemail that prompted Williams to drive to Bocoum's residence and confront
him. 5 Williams coaxed Bocoum out of his home and the altercation became
physical. 67 The scuffle resulted in Bocoum requiring medical treatment.7 Each8
party described a different sequence of events leading up to Bocoum's injuries.
1. 877 A.2d 1258 (N.J. 2005).
2. UNIF. MED. ACr. § 6(b)(1)(2005).

3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, amend. VL
4. See Williams, 877 A.2d at 1260.

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1261. Bocoum was treated for the cut on his wrist and then released. Id.
8. Id. at 1260.
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Bocoum claimed that Williams wielded a machete and cut Bocoum on the wrist
and foot. 9 Williams, however, claimed that he did not have a machete and Bocoum cut himself when they fell into some garbage cans.10 Furthermore, Williams
claimed that Bocoum hit him with a large shovel, while Bocoum and two other
witnesses claimed Bocoum never picked up a shovel."1
Williams left the scene and the police later arrested him at his apartment. 2
After Williams' arrest, he filed a harassment complaint in municipal court against
Bocoum for the threatening messages left on Williams' voicemail.' 3 The municipal court sent the harassment complaint to mediation. 14 The mediation
was un5
successful and therefore the case was sent back to municipal court.'
A grand jury indicted Williams on aggravated assault and two charges of
weapons possession.16 At trial, Williams claimed self-defense and sought, in support of his claim, the testimony of Josiah Hall (Hall), the mediator for the harassment complaint mediation.' 7 During the trial, Williams' attorney questioned Hall
outside the courtroom; Hall stated that Bocoum had admitted in mediation that he
had picked up the shovel. 18 The trial court refused to relax the confidentiality
protections of the mediation session, and rejected Hall's testimony because of the
strong public policy considerations supporting confidentiality of mediation sessions. 19 The jury found Williams guilty on two of the three charges. 20 The appellate division upheld the trial court's exclusion of the mediator's testimony and
affirmed the jury conviction, maintaining that Williams had received a fair trial.2'
Williams appealed the trial court's denial of the use of Hall's testimony and
the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification on the issue of admissibility
of the mediator's testimony. 22 Williams asserted that the mediator's testimony
could help exonerate him and claimed that the trial court's exclusion of the mediator's testimony "deprived him of his right to fully present a defense. 2 3 Williams
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Bocoum's wife and his wife's brother both witnessed the altercation and claimed that Bocoum never picked up the shovel and never swung it at Williams. Id.
12. Id. The police found an unsheathed machete at Williams' apartment and found a machete sheath
on the sidewalk in front of Bocoum's home. Id. at 1260-61.
13. Id. at 1261.
14. Id. The municipal court may require parties to attend mediation at any time after a complaint is
filed. N.J. R. Gen. App. R. 1:40-4 (2004).
15. Williams, 877 A.2d at 1261.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1261, 1268-69.
18. Id. Hall stated that Bocoum admitted picking up the shovel, but claimed he did not hit anyone
with it. Id.
19. Id. at 1262. The court stated that relaxing the confidentiality of mediation "really obliterates the
whole dispute resolution process." Id.
20. Id. The jury convicted Williams of third-degree aggravated assault and fourth-degree possession
of a weapon and acquitted Williams on the third-degree weapons charge. Id. Williams was sentenced
to three years probation, fined $1,162 (including court costs), and required to attend anger management
counseling and perform community service. Id.
21. Id. The Appellate court held that, in this case, justice did not require relaxing the confidentiality
requirements of mediation created by N.J. R. Gen. App. R. 1:40-4 because Williams had received a
fully tried case before a jury. Id. However, the court also noted that the mediator's testimony may
have helped establish Williams' self-defense claim. Id.
22. State v. Williams, 866 A.2d 983 (N.J. 2004).
23. Williams, 877 A.2d at 1262.
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claimed Hall's testimony would help establish Williams' assertion of self-defense
by bolstering the credibility
of Williams' earlier testimony that Bocoum had
"wielded" the shovel. 24 In addition, Williams claimed that Hall's testimony would
contradict the State's witnesses, who said Bocoum did not charge at Williams
with the shovel, and thus Williams could move the court to impeach their testimony. 25 While the State recognized Williams' right to present a complete defense, the State also argued that courts may limit a defense and Williams presented no "compelling reasons" why the trial court should have admitted Hall's
testimony. 26 Affirming the Appellate Division ruling that Hall's testimony was
inadmissible, the New Jersey Supreme Court held in a 5-2 decision that Williams'
need to present a complete defense with testimony concerning statements made in
mediation, did not outweigh the interest in27preserving mediation confidentiality
when the evidence was otherwise available.
II1. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Mediation is a unique dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party
facilitates problem solving and conciliation between the parties while aiding the
parties in developing a mutually agreeable resolution themselves.2 8 Mediation has
been utilized in various forms ranging from international disputes mediated by
political leaders to community disagreements in remote African and Central
American regions settled by an "elder" family member. 29 In the United States,
mediation was used to settle conflicts in colonial New England. Mediation has
become more formalized over the years, beginning with the creation of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in 1947 as a means to resolve unionmanagement conflicts. 30 With the alternative dispute resolution movement in the
1960s, mediation became more prominent and widely used throughout the United
States as a means for disputing parties to develop a resolution superior to other
possible outcomes. 3'
A. Public Policy Supporting Confidentiality in Mediation
The proposition that confidentiality is an essential element of effective mediation is evidenced by strong scholarly support for mediation confidentiality and the
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1263.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1270. Williams was allowed at trial to give testimony as to what Bocoum said during the
mediation. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court also noted that Williams' defense had ample opportunity to cross-examine Bocoum and the State's witnesses. Id. In dissent, Justice Long agreed with the
majority's holding that relevant and necessary evidence necessary to the defense in a criminal proceeding will not be shielded by a privilege. Id. (Long, J., dissenting). However, Justice Long disagreed
with the court's conclusion that Hall's testimony was not relevant and necessary because Hall was the
only "neutral" witness and therefore his testimony was not "otherwise available." Id. at 1271 (Long,
J., dissenting).
28. See Anne M. Burr, Confidentiality in Mediation Communications: A Privilege Worth Protecting, 57 APR -DiSP. RESOL. J. 66, 66 (2002).
29. JAMES J. ALFINI, MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (2001).

30. Id.
31. Id.at 1-2.
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existence of statutes protecting confidentiality of mediation communications in
every state. 32 Unrestrained communication between the parties and the mediator
is necessary during the mediation process to foster agreements which may not
otherwise be reached.33 Confidentiality alleviates the "threat of disclosure" of
sensitive information that commonly restricts open communication between adverse parties in other forums. 34 Not only does confidentiality in mediation facilitate candor between the parties, but in some disputes, confidentiality is essentially
parties and may be required for any coma "substitute for trust" between adverse
35
munication to occur between them.
Additionally, confidentiality is important to the mediation process because it
assists mediators in maintaining neutrality by assuring participants that the mediator will not disclose mediation communications. 36 Mediator neutrality is a fundamental principal of mediation because it encourages effective relationships between the mediator and the parties, as well as maintains the perception of mediators as unbiased neutrals to the public at large. 37 Moreover, if judicial action is
pursued after the mediation, confidentiality is necessary to maintain the judicial
process as a separate action from the mediation. 38 The separation between the
mediation and future litigation preserves the integrity of both processes. Confidentiality is even more essential to preserve the integrity of the processes when
the mediation is court-mandated due to the risk that the neutrality of the judge or
mediator may be compromised.39
Another consideration which supports mediation confidentiality is that mediators and mediation programs require insulation from the harassment and distraction of frequent subpoenas. 4° Confidentiality is also important to protect unsophisticated or unrepresented parties from being disadvantaged by revealing information or making admissions that would undermine their position in future litigation.4'
B. New Jersey Mediator'sPrivilege
New Jersey has established the Complementary Dispute Resolution Program
(CDR), which authorizes a Superior Court or Municipal Court judge to order parties to participate in mediation at any time after a complaint is filed.42 The statutes
governing the CDR program establish confidentiality for the mediation process by
prohibiting, without consent of the parties, admission of disclosures by the parties
32. Ellen E. Deason, The Questfor Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or
Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 79, 80 (2001). See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238
(1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 679C.104 (West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a (1999); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:4112 (2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1805 (1993).
33. Deason, supranote 32, at 80.
34. Id. at 81.
35. Id. at 82.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 83.
39. Id.
40. ALFINI, supra note 29, at 195.
41. Id. at 194-95.
42. N.J. R. Gen. Application R. 1:40-4(a).
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during the mediation process in any "civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal proceeding. '4 3 This statute establishes confidentiality protections for the mediator participating in a CDR mediation by stating that "[nlo mediator may participate in any
subsequent hearing or trial of the mediated matter or appear as witness or counsel
for any person in the same or any related matter."" However, the statute also
establishes a duty of the mediator to report any information received at the mediation if the mediator reasonably believes that such disclosure will prevent a mediation participant "from committing
a criminal or illegal act likely to result in death
' 45
or serious bodily harm.
The New Jersey statutes also provide that the Rules of Court "shall be construed to secure a just determination... [and] fairness in administration." 46 Furthermore, the statutes allow the court to relax or dispense with any rule, as long as
it does not explicitly prohibit relaxation, if adhering to the rule would create an
injustice.47 The CDR rules similarly allow relaxation or modification of the CDR
rules to prevent injustice or inequity. 48 There is significant support, though, for
the position that relaxation should be an exception and not the rule.49
C. MediatorPrivilege Under the Uniform Mediation Act
New Jersey has adopted the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA), which also establishes confidentiality for mediation sessions.50 The UMA provides that mediating parties, the mediator, and non-party participants of the mediation may "refuse
to disclose, and may prevent any other person from disclosing, a mediation communication." 5' However, there are several exceptions to this privilege. The privilege is ineffective in a criminal proceeding "if a court ... finds, after a hearing in
camera, that the.., proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is not
otherwise available, and that there is a need for the evidence that substantially
outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality. ' 52 The party seeking the evidence or testimony from a mediation has the burden of proving that the evidence
is not otherwise available and that the need for the evidence
substantially out53
weighs the interest in preserving mediation confidentiality.
43. Id. at 1:40-4(c).

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. N.J. R. Gen, Application R. 1:1-2.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1:40-10.
49. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Lewis, 788 A.2d 941,947 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001) ("While
having a laudable purpose, R. 1:1-2 provides a very limited basis for relaxation ....
A frequent or
freewheeling use of R.1:1-2 would lead to a sublimation of all other rules, allowing decisions to be
rendered on nothing more than a gestalt-like methodology."); Ricci v. Corporate Express of The East,
Inc., 779 A.2d 1114, 1119 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) ("[R]ecourse to the relaxation provision
should be sparing."); ERA Advantage Realty, Inc. v. River Bend Dev. Co., Inc., 663 A.2d 656, 658
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) ("[T]he rules are to be relaxed when the interests of justice require.");
Oliviero v. Porter Hayden Co., 575 A.2d 50, 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) ("R. 1:1-2 should be
used sparingly.")
50. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23C-1 to -13.
51. Id. § 2A:23C-4b.
52. Id. § 2A:23C-6b(1).
53. UNIF. MED. ACT. § 6, cmt. 9.
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The UMA's approach to confidentiality of mediation communications when
such communication is sought in criminal proceedings does not establish a brightline rule, but instead gives courts discretion to determine when the need for the
testimony outweighs the interest of protecting mediation communications. 54 By
creating a framework for courts to use that is balanced and flexible, the UMA
acknowledged the split within the states regarding the privilege afforded mediation communications when sought in criminal proceedings and strove to create a
universally acceptable uniform law. 55 While the UMA neither prohibits nor permits all mediation communications from being used in criminal proceedings, the
UMA does provide that, initially, the privilege exists and can only be overcome in
specific cases. 56 However, it is not easy for the party seeking admission of mediation communications into evidence to overcome the privilege because not only
must the evidence be otherwise unavailable, but the need for the evidence
57 must
substantially outweigh the interest in protecting mediation confidentiality.
D.

Criminal Cases and the FourteenthAmendment

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits states
from depriving citizens of life or liberty "without due process of law."5" In Strickland v. Washington,59 the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth

Amendment guarantees every criminal defendant the right to a fair trial.60 Further, the Court held that the Constitution's guarantee of a fair trial is defined by
several provisions of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment provides the
criminal defendant with the ability to confront adverse witnesses and "compulsory
process[es] for obtaining witnesses in his favor," such as subpoenas and court
orders. The guarantee of a fair trial essentially provides the criminal defendant
with a "fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. 6 3
The New Jersey Constitution has language identical to that of the United
States Constitution, thereby affording defendants the same rights. 64 The right to
confront adverse witnesses provides criminal defendants the opportunity to crossexamine and impeach the State's witnesses. 65 The rights to examine adverse witnesses, present testimony, and be represented by counsel are the minimum essential requirements for a criminal defendant to have a fair trial.66 The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to a compulsory process is based

54. Deason, supra note 32, at 106-10.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. There are many arguments supporting confidentiality in mediation. See Rojas v. Superior
Court, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (Cal. 2004) (confidentiality essential to mediation because it fosters open
communication); See supra Part IH.A.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
59. 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984).
60. Id. at 684-85.
61. Id.
62. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI
63. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
64. See N.J. CONST. art LI 10.
65. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974).
66. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 308.
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on the 67fundamental right of "an accused to present witnesses in his own defense."
In Crane v. Kentucky, 68 the United States Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause and compulsory process rights of the United States Constitution
guarantee "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." 69 Further,
the Court held that the "opportunity would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on... credibility ...when
such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence., 70 However, the
rights to examine adverse State witnesses and present testimony are "not absolute,
and may, in appropriate circumstances, bow to competing interests." 71 Courts
may reject testimony helpful to a criminal defendant if such exclusion will further
"interests of fairness and reliability." 72 Therefore, assertions of privilege to exclude testimony, which often "'undermine[s] the search for truth in the administration of justice,' are accepted to the extent that they outweigh the public interest in
the search for truth. 7 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that "if evidence is
relevant and necessary to a fair determination
of the issues, the admission of the
74
evidence is constitutionally compelled.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In State v. Williams,75 the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the extent to
which confidentiality will protect mediation communications when the defendant
in a criminal prosecution seeks testimony' from the mediator to resolve a factual
issue and establish his self-defense claim. In upholding the trial court and appellate court decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the privilege establishing mediation confidentiality can only be overcome in a criminal case when
the information is not otherwise available and the need for the evidence substantially outweighs the interest in protecting mediation communications.
The court gave several reasons for justifying why it did not address the constitutionality of the confidentiality provision of the UMA. First, the court did not
address constitutionality because the issue had not been raised in oral arguments
to the court. 78 Second, the UMA was not in effect when the events at issue in the
case occurred. 79 Third, the court held that the facts of this case did not even meet
the lesser proposed "Constitutional" standard for waiving mediation confidential-

67. State v. Sanchez, 670 A.2d 535, 544 (N.J. 1996).
68. 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
69. Id. at 690.
70. Id.
71. State v. Budis, 593 A.2d 784, 790 (N.J. 1991).
72. Id.
73. State v. Szemple, 640 A.2d 817, 821 (N.J. 1994) (quoting State v. Dyal, 478 A.2d 390, 394 (N.J.
1984)).
74. State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 257 (N.J. 2003).
75. 877 A.2d 1258 (N.J. 2005).
76. Id. at 1263.
77. Id. at 1270.
78. Id. at 1265.
79. Id.
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ity.80 Therefore, the UMA was used as a "framework" to determine whether
the
8
facts of the case should prompt the court to relax the mediator's privilege. 1
An initial inquiry by the court found that the first requirement necessary to relax the mediator's privilege, evidence sought in a criminal proceeding, was easily
met because the proponent for relaxing the privilege was being prosecuted on
criminal charges relating to the mediation. 82 However, the court next noted that
public policy supports settling legal disputes, and that confidentiality is an essen83
tial element of successful mediation to help parties reach agreeable settlements.
Further, confidentiality is necessary to enhance the conciliatory nature of mediation as well as the goal of open and honest communication within mediation. 84
Because of the unique characteristics of mediation in promoting unrestrained communication, confidentiality is important to allow the participants to fully participate without fear that their words will be used against them.85 The importance of
mediator neutrality was stressed as essential to successful mediation. The court
found that mediator confidentiality fosters mediator neutrality by86 assuring participants that the mediator will hold their information in confidence.
After finding a "substantial interest in protecting mediation confidentiality,"
the court assessed the "nature and quality" of the evidence in question to determine the actual need for the information. 87 Because there were questions regarding the reliability of the mediator's testimony, the court held that the evidence was
not essential for the defendant to have a complete defense for a fair trial. 88 Therefore, the court held that the minimal need for the mediator's testimony
did not
89
outweigh the substantial interest in preserving mediation confidentiality.
In completing their analysis of the UMA, the court last addressed whether the
evidence sought from the mediator's testimony was otherwise available. 90 To
begin, the court noted there was "substantial evidence" other than that from the
mediation sufficient to present the claim of self-defense.9' In this case, the defendant testified as to what was said during mediation, and further, there was sufficient evidence other than the mediator's testimony that would still have presented
a complete defense. Because the defendant presented significant evidence concerning his claim of self-defense, and because the defendant was not prevented
from asserting a complete defense, the court held that the
93 evidence sought from
the mediator's testimony was, in fact, otherwise available.
Justice Long, in a dissent joined by Justice Albin, agreed with the majority's
interpretation of the law governing mediation confidentiality and the right to relax
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1266.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1266-67.
87. Id. at 1268.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1269.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The defense thoroughly cross-examined three witnesses testifying for the State. Id. Defendant's wife testified in support of defendant's position. Id.
93. Id. at 1270.
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the privilege for use in criminal proceedings. 94 However, Justice Long disagreed
with the majority's application of the law to the present facts. Justice Long believed that the evidence was not otherwise available because the mediator was the
only disinterested party with knowledge of the events and therefore his testimony
was essential to the defense. 95 In conclusion, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a
5-2 decision, held that under the guidance of the UMA, mediator testimony could
not be introduced into evidence in a criminal proceeding where the information
was otherwise available and where the need for the testimony96did not substantially
outweigh the interest in preserving mediation confidentiality.

V. COMMENT
A cursory reading of the New Jersey Supreme Court ruling in State v. Williams could easily lead one to conclude that the confidentiality privilege afforded
mediation proceedings will not be relaxed, absent extreme circumstances.97 The
98

UMA is clear, though, that it does not create a blanket privilege for mediation.
Although there are many public policy reasons that are routinely asserted to justify
the need for confidentiality protections of mediations, it is also clear that no legislature has sought to employ an absolute
privilege, and that all allow examination
99
of exceptions on an individual basis.
When mediation information is sought for use in a criminal proceeding, the
UMA provides a process whereby the party seeking the information may prove at
an in camera hearing that the information is not otherwise available and the need
for the evidence substantially outweighs the interest in protecting mediation communications.I °° This exception places an acceptable burden on the party seeking
the information, but the Williams court essentially made this an insurmountable
requirement.
The existence of mediation does not depend entirely on maintaining a confi0
dentiality privilege protecting mediation disclosures. I1
Further, mediation participants do not require the protections of strict confidentiality because other safe-

94. Id. (Long, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1266.
98. Several exceptions are expressly provided to allow relaxation of the confidentiality privilege.
UNIF. MED. ACT, § 6. Exceptions exist if all parties waive the privilege in a written agreement, if the
mediation was open to the public, when threats of committing a crime are made, when information
used in mediator malpractice claims, if the mediation revealed information proving adult or child abuse
or neglect, and in certain circumstances when information is sought to prove a defense in a criminal
proceeding. Id.
99. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(C) (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(4)
(Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. § 44.201(5) (Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(l)(k) (1994); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 435.014(2) (1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.205(2)(c) (1993); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 154.073(c) (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7(1)(a) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01- 581.22(iii) (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(l)(b) (Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. Ann.
§ 1-43- 103(c)(iv) (Supp. 1994).
100. UNIF. MED. ACT, § 6.
101. See Joel M. Grossman, Clarifying the Confidentiality of Mediation Evidence, 27 APR.-L.A. Law
14, 20 (2004) ("The benefits of mediation are so significant that it will continue to thrive as the best
alternative to costly and uncertain litigation.").
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guards currently exist.'0 2 In fact, mediation has flourished without the existence
of an absolute privilege protecting mediation communications.' 03 It is clear that
mediation is most successful when parties are open and honest, and willing to
objectively view their position and the position of the opposing party; however,
the protections afforded to information revealed during mediation by a confidentiality privilege only minimally improve the candor between the parties. 1°4 Confidentiality cannot eliminate the preexisting, deep-rooted animosity and distrust that
exists between adverse parties in most cases. Once a dispute has escalated to the
point that a resolution process such as mediation is required, the parties have
likely exhausted all other options and are now relying on outside assistance to
help facilitate a resolution to their conflict.
It is naYve to believe that simply informing mediation participants that their
statements made during the mediation are protected by the privilege of confidentiality will eliminate all apprehension of the parties to offering information.1 0 5 An
unrepresented party will likely be unsure of the mediation process and unwilling
to fully participate for fear of saying something that will harm their position.
First, unrepresented parties who are unaware of the mediation process are not
likely to completely understand the brief explanation by the mediator of the confidentiality protections of the process. Second, even when a party has read a mediation agreement completely, without representation, the party will still be uncertain
of the implications of confidentiality and, therefore, may not be completely candid
with their communications. Skepticism of the law in general, and reluctance to
participate in legal proceedings, will prevent the unsophisticated and unrepresented party from being completely open and honest during mediation even with
the assurance of confidentiality. 106
On the other hand, parties who are more familiar with the law and are represented by counsel, whether or not the attorney is present during the mediation,
also may not be completely candid simply because of the existence of a confidentiality privilege.' 7 An attorney representing a client participating in mediation
102. See Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
1, 35-36 (1986) ("An expanded Rule 408, coupled with careful drafting of the confidentiality clause in
a mediation agreement where such agreements are used, and attention to the public policy generally
favoring out-of-court settlements, adequately protects parties to mediation.").
103. Id. at 32.
104. See J. Brad Reich, A Call For Intellectual Honesty: A Response to the Uniform Mediation Act's
Privilege Against Disclosure, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 197, 213-15 (2001) ("There was no significant
difference in disclosure between no mention of privilege and mention of privilege."); See generally
U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (1974) (The Supreme Court noted that the candor of advisors to the
President will not be hindered because no privilege protects such communication.).
105. See generally Jean R. Stemlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a NonadversarialSetting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 269, 345-48 (1999) (indicating that some parties in mediation do not wish to participate for
numerous reasons).
106. See generally Carol M. Langford, Depression, Substance Abuse, and Intellectual Property
Lawyers, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 875, 886-87 (2005) (stating that there is a "societal disconnect" within
the law, and the general public has a poor perception of those in the legal profession); See generally
Frederick Schauer, The Calculus of Distrust, 77 VAL. U. L. REV. 653, 653-55 (1991) (discussing the
American distrust for governmental power, including a distrust of the judicial system).
107. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer As Consensus Builder: Ethics Fora New Practice, 70
TENN. L. REV. 63 (2002) (stating that there is no obligation forcing lawyers to be candid during mediation and some neutrals actually seek contractual agreements to force disclosure from participating
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will certainly prepare his or her client prior to the mediation. 108 The preparation
will likely include an explanation of the confidentiality protections afforded the
mediation process. However, the attorney will also caution the client not to offer
more information than is necessary, and not to admit anything or offer anything
that will compromise their position in negotiating with the other party or in future
litigation. 109
No matter how great the protections afforded by a confidentiality privilege,
the communications between the parties will never be completely unrestrained
because of the inherent nature of the relationship between disputing parties. Further, because communication between adverse parties will always be strained,
confidentiality will not eliminate that tension. Confidentiality may help foster
open communications between mediation participants; however, the assistance of
confidentiality is not essential to a successful mediation. Whenever competing
interests are present, the confidentiality privilege should yield to the competing
interests. 110 It is clear that when a privilege is generally asserted, that privilege
must yield to the competing interests of presenting a complete defense in a criminal proceeding. 1 ' Therefore, a mediation privilege must yield to the specific need
for essential evidence in a criminal proceeding, a need that existed in Williams.
Other arguments in support of confidentiality include that it maintains mediator neutrality and protects the integrity of mediation and other judicial proceedings
by keeping the processes separate; however, when a factual dispute exists and the
mediator is in a position to "break the tie," the testimony should be admitted
unless it would require the mediator to make a judgment or conclusion rather than
simply relate an objective accounting of facts disclosed during the mediation.
Although the perception of partiality may arise when one party seeks mediator
testimony, this risk does not outweigh the importance of having a fair decision
based on the facts ascertained from all available evidence and successfully complete the "pursuit of justice." A concern may arise regarding mediator bias if a
mediator is asked to make statements of opinion concerning mediation communications. If a mediator testifies based on his or her own conclusion as to the parties' statements or liability based on the facts, then the mediator's neutrality can
certainly be called into question. Mediators are supposed to maintain impartiality
attorneys); See generally Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generatedin Court-ConnectedMediation-Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private FacilitativeProcess and the Reality of Public
Adversarial Justice, Consequently, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 509, 537 (2004) (even when a
mediator encourages candor, parties likely may not believe disclosures of other party).
108. 6 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 146:11 (2d ed. 2006)
("Prior to mediation, clients and attorneys should discuss mediation strategies and alternatives.")
109. See id. Attorneys are expected to "coach" their clients prior to and during mediation. See Randy
Frances Kandel, Power Plays: A Sociolinguistic Study of Inequality in Child Custody Mediationand a
HearsayAnalog Solution, 36 ARiz. L. REv. 879, 971 (1994); Mark R. Privratsky, Comment, A Practitioner's Guide to General Order 95-10: Mediation Plan For the United States District Court of Nebraska, 75 NEB. L. REV. 91, 108 (1996).

110. See Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
mediator's privilege must yield to the competing interest of a minor's constitutional right to impeach
an adverse witness in a delinquency proceeding). Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bramalea
California, Inc., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 928 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the Legislature did not
intend the statutory confidentiality privileges afforded mediation to allow lawyers acting in bad faith to
avoid sanctions).
111. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713.
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and not draw conclusions as to any of the mediation communications. However,
mediator testimony which simply states a fact or recounts a statement made by a
party during mediation does not call the mediator's impartiality into question as
long as the mediator does not include his own impressions of the statement.
Therefore, confidentiality should yield and mediators should be allowed to testify
as to specific facts concerning mediation or statements made during mediation as
long as the testimony does not include the mediator's impressions or conclusions
of those facts.
While the party opposing disclosure may question the neutrality of the mediator, mediation participants in general will not immediately question the neutrality
of all mediators. Rather, the public is likely to support the disclosure of information that will essentially further the pursuit of justice. It is argued that allowing
testimony from mediations in judicial proceedings will create a perception that
mediation is simply an extension of the judicial process. However, all dispute
processes are inherently tied together and unless parties use mediation solely as a
discovery tool, any perceived connection between mediation and judicial processes is not detrimental to either institution. Further, the acceptance of evidence
tending to promote justice in settling disputes will improve the integrity of all
dispute resolution processes.
The current UMA exception to mediation confidentiality when information is
sought in a criminal proceeding provides the party seeking disclosure the opportunity to show that the need for the information outweighs the interests in protecting
mediation confidentiality. While the burden of showing that the need for the information "substantially outweighs" the interest in maintaining mediation confidentiality is a high standard, courts should not further increase the difficulty of
satisfying that standard by making an individual assessment of the validity of the
evidence and basing its decision on that analysis.
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not allow mediator testimony in Williams, and justified its refusal to relax the confidentiality of mediation because
they did not believe the mediator's testimony would be unbiased and therefore
found that the evidence was otherwise available. 1 12 The court's discretion to admit testimony is separate from the jury's duty to afford the proper weight to specific testimony." 3 However, the Williams court assessed the "nature and quality"
of the mediator's testimony and determined that it did not qualify as competent
evidence. 1 4 The court reasoned that the evidence the mediator would present was
already present and did not support the defendant's claim of self-defense because5
the mediator's testimony did not exactly confirm the defendant's position."
However, it is clear that the mediator's testimony did contradict the statements
made by the victim and could have influenced the jury's decision on the defendant's claim of self-defense." 6 Considering the substantial constitutional rights
provided to a criminal defendant in presenting their defense, it is hard to reconcile
the court's decision to uphold the confidentiality privilege and not allow the mediator's testimony. In a factual dispute, a mediator with knowledge of the facts is
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

State v. Williams, 877 A.2d 1258, 1268 (N.J. 2005).
Id. at 1272 (Long, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1268.
Id.at 1269.
Id.at 1271 (Long, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2006/iss1/18

12

Gill: Gill: When Confidentiality Is Not Essential
No. 1]

Confidentiality is not Essential

uniquely suited to present unbiased testimony that sheds light on the dispute and
therefore it is not the type of information that is "otherwise available."
Applying Williams to future criminal cases where information from mediation
is sought may produce unconstitutional results. The constitutional rights embodied in the Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause demand that a criminal defendant have the opportunity to present a complete defense. "17 Confidentiality of mediation proceedings is in conflict with these constitutional rights when
the defendant seeks admission of mediation disclosures to prove their defense. If
the evidence is otherwise available, then the information can remain confidential
and no constitutional concerns arise. However, when the evidence is not otherwise available and the court prevents admission of the testimony on the basis of
confidentiality, a defendant's constitutional rights are affected. The defendant
must prove that the need for the evidence "substantially outweighs" the interest in
protecting mediation confidentiality. While this appears to place a substantial
burden on the defense, the overwhelming interest in allowing a complete defense
for criminal defendants will almost always substantially outweigh any subordinate
interest in preserving mediation confidentiality. The result in Williams could lead
other courts to erroneously exclude essential defense evidence because of the
court's choice to weigh the evidence, rather than leaving that to the jury, and determining that the need for the evidence is not substantial.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mediation is a unique alternative dispute resolution process whereby disputing parties engage in a conciliatory process in which the actual parties determine
whether or not to settle, and dictate the terms of any subsequent agreement. Confidentiality has long been seen as an essential element of mediation without which
mediation may not be effective or as widely used for settling disputes. While
confidentiality is now well entrenched in mediation, it should not be seen as an
absolute requirement to promoter successful mediation. In Williams, the court
chose to examine the validity of the mediation information sought and denied
relaxation of the privilege to allow the criminal defendant to introduce the evidence because it questioned the veracity of the evidence and decided it was not
substantial enough to overcome the need for mediation confidentiality. When
confidentiality is used to prevent the defendant in a criminal proceeding from
presenting a complete defense, the interests in preserving mediation confidentiality must give way to overwhelming Constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants and allow that evidence to be presented.
PATRICK GILL

117. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; amend. VI.
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